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Abstract
This article addresses the historical emergence of business cooperation. We resort
to Höpner’s (2007) concepts of organization and coordination in order to analyze
how firms progressively engaged in Business Interest Associations (BIAs) and inter-
locking directorates during the first part of the 20th century. Our inquiry is based on
a network analysis on large firms of the Swiss machine, electrotechnical and metal-
lurgy (MEM) sector. Our results show that before the First World War, only major
firms were promoting coordination and organization through, respectively, inter-
locking directorates and BIAs. Although many firms were reluctant to cooperate in
the first place, interests beyond the firm level (organization) and the economic needs
of firms (coordination) had cumulative effects, and most firms progressively
engaged in both mechanisms of cooperation from the interwar period. We argue
that differentiating between organization and coordination contributes to a more
nuanced understanding of the emergence of non-liberal capitalism.
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1. Introduction
In 1909, the socialist and trade unionist Robert Grimm (1881–1958) argued that the condi-
tions under which the labor movement had to pursue its objectives had dramatically
changed with the creation of strong and well-organized employers’ associations. He wrote:
‘The times when trade unions could mow down one firm after the other are gone forever.
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Every raid on a firm is henceforth considered as a declaration of war on all employers.
Immediately, the employers’ federation enters the game and puts all its force to crack down
on any strike and to make it ineffective’ (Grimm, 1909, p. 57). To confront what the labor
leader called ‘employers’ terrorism’ (Ibid., p. 16), he urged his fellow workers to give their
support to industrial labor federations.
One year later, Eduard Sulzer-Ziegler (1854–1913), one of the main industrialists of his
time, told his fellow employers how dangerous the labor movement had become, as it: ‘had
declared a war on the entire social order, capitalism in general and the firm in particular’
(Sulzer-Ziegler, 1910, p. 61). ‘Si vis pacem, para bellum’ explained Sulzer-Ziegler: ‘If the em-
ployers want peace, they must unite; otherwise, if they fail to unite, if they do not get pre-
pared for the war, then will they have the war as a matter of certainty’ (Ibid., p. 72).
Labor activism is one reason that pushed people like Sulzer-Ziegler to promote em-
ployers’ and businessmen’s collective action. Influencing the intervention of the state in the
economy, stimulating exports, improving standardization, promoting skills among the labor
force or regulating competition, have also been important reasons for businessmen to collab-
orate. Furthermore, firms have a whole range of interactions with one another, including
selling and buying products and services, borrowing or lending capital, sharing board mem-
bers and sealing alliances. Like Martin and Swank (2012, p. 1) have recently argued,
‘Employers are social animals and, as such, develop their policy interests in packs’. Firms are
nevertheless in competition with one another, and it is anything but obvious that they can
prevent the pack from falling apart under the pressure of competition (Galambos, 1966).
Business coordination has been identified as a crucial element, explaining the great variety
in the way national economies are organized. A classical issue has been to draw a line between
liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs) (Hall and
Soskice, 2001), or liberal and non-liberal types of capitalism (Streeck and Yamamura, 2001).
This variety of capitalism (VoC) has been extensively discussed, and remains much debated
(Hancké, 2009; Herrigel and Zeitlin, 2010). Recent research has insisted on the necessity to re-
fine the usual dichotomy between CMEs and LMEs. For instance, Höpner (2007) makes a dis-
tinction between two dimensions of non-liberal capitalism. According to him, the coordination
function of institutions aims at solving firms’ collective problems in order to raise profits, while
organization ‘transcends individual maximization strategies and adjusts them to collective
interests beyond maximization’ (Höpner, 2007, p. 10). This distinction allows him to differenti-
ate the current process of liberalization between declining coordination and disorganization. In
a similar way, Thelen (2014) investigates the relationship between employers’ coordination
and social inequality. She shows that employers’ coordination can persist with declining soli-
darity, while egalitarian capitalism can overcome declining coordination. Disentangling the dif-
ferent dimensions of non-liberal capitalism allows the authors to highlight different trajectories
of liberalization in advanced political economies. We argue that it offers new insights in the
analysis of the emergence of non-liberal capitalism as well.
Martin and Swank (2012) provide a useful framework to enable the understanding of
the construction of different models of business coordination. They show that political fac-
tors were decisive in the emergence of Business Interest Associations (BIAs). However, they
mainly investigate the logic of influence of BIAs—i.e. the way they interact with the state
and unions—rather than their logic of membership—i.e. the way BIAs interact with firms
(Deeg et al., 2013). As a consequence, the authors do not discuss the interaction of BIAs
with other forms of coordination, such as interlocking directorates or cartelization.
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In this contribution, we use Höpner’s distinction between coordination and organization
to complement Martin and Swank’s approach of the historical construction of business co-
ordination in Switzerland. The Swiss case is particularly interesting as this country—like
Japan—combines coordination ‘with features of disorganization’ (Höpner, 2007, p. 15).
This configuration explains why Switzerland has always been difficult to situate in the clas-
sical dichotomy between CMEs and LMEs (Trampusch and Mach, 2011). This article ana-
lyzes the emergence of BIAs and interlocking directorates as expressions of organization and
coordination. These two major forms of cooperation have received strong attention among
researchers. However, the way they interact remains largely unexplored (for an exception,
see Windolf and Beyer, 1995, pp. 21–23). We formulate the following research question:
when and why did firms engage in either one or both of these channels of cooperation?
Answering this question should help us to complement Martin and Swank’s study by taking
into account interlocking directorates as a form of business coordination. On the other
hand, our approach intends to take into account the political factors that contributed to the
construction of business coordination, a dimension barely discussed in the literature on
interlocking directorates.
In order to answer our research question, we examine how firms in the Swiss leading in-
dustrial sector—the machine, electrotechnical and metallurgy (MEM) sector—progressively
engaged in BIAs and interlocking directorates. We show how these two institutional ar-
rangements interacted during the first half of the 20th century, the formative period of busi-
ness cooperation in Switzerland. We argue that coordination and organization—highlighted
by the interplay of interlocking directorates and BIAs—followed distinct but cumulative
paths and contributed to the growth of a dense MEM business network, which, in turn, de-
cisively shaped the Swiss political economy. After a comprehensive discussion of the theoret-
ical stakes of our research (Sections 2 and 3) and the presentation of method and data
(Section 4), we proceed in a chronological manner in order to analyze the different phases of
the historical construction of collaboration among MEM elites over time (Section 5).
2. The historical construction of business cooperation
Scholars have underlined the importance of taking into account the historical perspective in
order to understand the current varieties of capitalism (Thelen and Kume, 2006;
Sluyterman, 2015). Similar patterns led, in the late 19th century, to the emergence of institu-
tions that constrained the spread of free markets in Germany and Japan. Both countries,
however, developed different paths toward non-liberal capitalism (Streeck 2001). Dore et al.
(1999) claim that finance and corporate structures were quite similar in Germany, Japan,
Britain and the USA in the 1920s, but the Depression and then the Second World War led to
divergent development—intensifying industrial conflicts in the USA and worker–manager
cooperation in Germany and Japan.
Martin and Swank (2012) investigate the historical construction of business coordination
and show how the ‘rules of the game’ (the structure of political parties and the form of gov-
ernment) influence the coming of different models of social and economic organization.
Again, the interwar period was a decisive period, as the authors highlight that different mod-
els of employers’ coordination came into being during that period and remained relatively
stable for the rest of the century (Ibid., p. 18).
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Hancké (2012) underlines the importance of ‘historical and/or institutional precondition’
for the emergence of business coordination. However, he shows that interfirm coordination
can also emerge in the absence of historical preconditions, as has been the case during the
post-1989 reindustrialization in Central and Eastern Europe countries, where states and pri-
vate associations were weak. This process, described by the author as ‘endogeneous coordin-
ation’—in opposition to historically induced or externally imposed coordination—shows
again that coordination is a dynamic process, rather than a fixed state.
The literature has highlighted the central role of three different institutions in the collective
action of firms, namely business associations, corporate networks and banks. First, BIAs ‘have
a clear and strong coordination function’ (Bouwens and Dankers, 2015, p. 105; see also
Wood, 2001; Streeck et al., 2006). According toMartin and Swank (2012, p. 16), BIAs encour-
age firms’ coordination among themselves, with labor, and with the government. The authors
highlight different models of employers’ coordination—macro-corporatist (in Denmark), sec-
toral (in Germany) and pluralist (in Britain and the USA)—depending on the capacity of peak
BIAs (i.e. those claiming to represent all business sectors) to centralize employers’ collective ac-
tion (Ibid., pp. 15–18). According to the authors, peak BIAs were able to centralize employers’
coordination in Denmark, but not in Britain and the USA, while sectoral coordination was
dominant in Germany. Furthermore, they argue that sectoral and peak BIAs were founded for
very different reasons. While ‘efforts to export, to control wages, to generate collective skills’
explained the development of the former, political factors were decisive for the creation of the
latter in order to overcome sectoral heterogeneity (Ibid., p. 35).
BIAs are the most visible form of coordination. However, as stated by Schmitter and
Streeck (1999, pp. 9–10): ‘If business interests do not (cannot?) find expression through formal
associational channels, the focus of attention must shift to other, less visible coordinative ar-
rangements such as . . . interlocking corporate directorates . . .’ (see also Offe and Wiesenthal,
1980, p. 75). Interlocking directorates—defined as the ties among firms that are created by indi-
viduals sitting simultaneously on two or more corporate boards—represent a very strong indi-
cator of collaboration between firms and are thus usually denser in CMEs than in LMEs
(Windolf and Nollert, 2001; Höpner and Krempel, 2003). In Germany, the corporate network
was thus one of the main institutions sustaining German cooperative capitalism, and it grew
denser as cartelization increased within the economy (Windolf, 2009). By contrast, interlocking
directorates have been perceived in the USA as a threat to competition; interlocks between firms
competing in the same markets were prohibited with the Clayton Act of 1914 (Mizruchi, 1996,
p. 273). At the least, any interlock is an important channel of communication through which
information can be transmitted (Scott, 1985, p. 5). For firms, an interlock may indicate cross-
shareholding, deals among firms or other forms of cooperation, such as cartels. For the busi-
ness elite, the configuration of interlocks may also have a broader significance as an indicator
of the structure of the capitalist class and of the cohesion within this class (Mizruchi, 1996).
Finally, banks play a crucial role in the corporate governance systems of CMEs. Indeed,
financial assets and liabilities in these economies rely mostly on bank deposits and direct
loans, providing a more stable financial framework for companies (Vitols, 2001, p. 171).
This configuration can be opposed to the one found in LMEs, where firms tend rather to fi-
nance themselves through financial markets, which can be accessed more quickly but which
are also more volatile (La Porta et al., 1999; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Accordingly, the
involvement of banks in the financing of companies has an impact on the structure of the
corporate network. Indeed, several studies have shown that large banks hold a central
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position in the corporate network of CMEs (e.g. Stokman and Wasseur, 1985), leading to
different interpretative models such as the ‘bank-control model’ according to which bankers
sit on the board of directors of the firms they are financing because they want to exert a con-
trol over their investment (Scott, 1985).
In order to understand the collective organization of business interests, one should thus
take into account the different forms business coordination can take, as they may fulfill differ-
ent functions. As a case in point, Lanzalaco (2008) distinguishes between capitalists’ individ-
ual and collective action on the one hand, but also between their actions as employers and as
businessmen on the other hand. For the author, these different types of action should not be
seen as separated, as they constitute ‘an integrated area of research in which market trends,
technological innovations, entrepreneurial strategies, industrial relations and political con-
cerns are all interrelated’ (Ibid., p. 295; see also Streeck, 1992, p. 80). To address this diver-
sity, we resort to Höpner’s (2007) distinction between coordination and organization.
According to the author, coordination means that ‘institutions help to overcome coordin-
ation dilemmas precisely in order to raise profits’ (Höpner, 2007, p. 7). In this sense, coordin-
ation takes place in the framework of rational choice institutionalism, as institutions solve
the coordination problems of self-interested actors. In contrast, the organized capitalism per-
spective corresponds to Durkheimian sociological institutionalism; in this case, the mission of
the firm is ‘transcended’ by the tensions that exist between the firm and society (Ibid., 2007,
pp. 7–9). In other words, while coordination emerges to support firms’ interests, organization
appears to support collective interests beyond the firm level when being under the pressure of
an external force. According to the author, coordination and organization are not conflicting
concepts; rather, they refer to different functions that institutions pursue.
3. Diversity within business coordination: the Swiss case in
comparative perspective
Switzerland combines some aspects typical of CMEs with some ‘liberal’ (Katzenstein, 1984)
or ‘conservative’ (Mach, 2006) elements more common in LMEs. The Swiss political econ-
omy is characterized by a weak central state, weak and fragmented unions, but with a strong
coordination among business actors (Trampusch and Mach, 2011, p. 15). As a consequence,
Switzerland combines employer coordination with low levels of organization (Höpner, 2007,
p. 13).
From a comparative perspective, Swiss BIAs stand out, having a particularly early foun-
dation (Lanzalaco, 2008, p. 305), as well as being especially influential and cohesive
(Streeck, 1992, p. 88; Humair et al., 2012). David et al. (2009, p. 28) argue that peak associ-
ations ‘facilitated a process of self-regulation within the economic world, with the business
elite trying to avoid any intervention from outside’. While peak BIAs were very important in
political matters, economic and social regulations were often dealt with at the sectoral level
(Eichenberger and Mach, 2011, p. 69). Following Martin and Swank’s argument on the
German case, federalism and the existence of multiple political parties combined in
Switzerland to create a ‘sectoral driven coordination’ of employers (Martin and Swank,
2012, p. 44). The MEM trade association, the Verein schweizerischer Maschinen-
Industrieller (VSM), was founded in 1883 in order to help firms of the sector to be repre-
sented in commercial exhibitions. The association allowed firms to act collectively in order
to defend the sector in domains such as tariff, tax, competition or transport policies. One of
Business cooperation in the Swiss machinery industry 619
its main functions was also to represent the sector in the Vorort (the main commercial and
industrial peak association), where the different sectors negotiated in order to influence the
economic policy of the central state. In reaction to the growing number of strikes at the turn
of the century, in 1905 the VSM created the employer’s association, the Arbeitgeberverband
schweizerischer Maschinen-Industrieller (ASM), in order to deal with labor market issues of
the sector (Gruner, 1988, pp. 813–836). There was thus a clear division of labor between
the VSM and the ASM.
The Swiss corporate network has also received strong attention from researchers. Several
contributions show the existence of a dense network among the largest firms during the
greater part of the 20th century (Schnyder et al., 2005; for the MEM sector, Ginalski,
2015), which has been perceived as an expression of the coordinated dimension of the Swiss
economy. Schnyder et al. (2005) show that this network was constituted progressively dur-
ing the first half of the 20th century; they also highlight the central position of the banks (see
also Rusterholz, 1985; Nollert, 1998; Ginalski et al., 2014). In this sense, Switzerland was
similar to other continental European countries such as Germany, Austria and the
Netherlands (Stokman and Wasseur, 1985).
The above-mentioned studies focus either on BIAs or on interlocks, and thus do not in-
vestigate how both institutions of coordination interacted. One exception is the contribution
of David et al. (2009), which shows that Swiss business elites relied on a dense network of
coordination based on interlocking directorates and peak BIAs. However, their study does
not integrate sectoral BIAs. In the context of the ‘sectoral driven coordination’ in
Switzerland, investigating the specific role of sectoral BIAs should be placed high on the re-
search agenda.
Relying on Höpner’s (2007) distinction between coordination and organization, we in-
vestigate the reasons that lead firms to engage in different forms of collaboration. In a theor-
etical perspective, the different institutions of cooperation (here we use the term cooperation
in a ‘neutral’ way to express coordination and/or organization) fulfill different functions.
Interlocks, and relations to banks through interlocks, respond to necessities regarding cor-
porate governance and interfirm relations. In this regard, interlocks can fulfill similar func-
tions to cartelization, which is another way for firms to regulate competition. Trade
associations contribute to collective goods regarding the product market, such as technical
standardization or the regulation of competition. They also enable business to influence pol-
itical authorities. Finally, employers’ associations are responsible for countering labor mo-
bilization and maintaining favorable conditions regarding industrial relations or vocational
training.
Following Höpner’s argument, interlocks—and cartels—are institutions of coordination,
as they primarily support firms’ interests in order to raise profits. In that sense, coordination
can be referred to as the economic function of cooperation identified by the VoC and inter-
locks literature. Respectively, employers’ associations fully correspond to Höpner’s concept
of organization, as they support collective interests beyond the firm level and are induced
under the pressure of an external force (the labor movement, for example). Finally, trade as-
sociations are located somehow in the middle, i.e. between coordination and organization,
as they aim at improving firms’ efficiency, as well as defending their interest in the political
arena.
Different configurations of cooperation among firms are then possible (see Figure 1):
through interlocks and both types of BIAs (1), through interlocks and employers’
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associations (2), through interlocks and trade associations (3), through employers’ associ-
ations and trade associations (4), through interlocks only (5), through employers’ associ-
ations only (6) or through trade associations only (7). Accordingly, each configuration
corresponds to different degrees of coordination and/or organization. For example, config-
uration (1) corresponds to the strongest form of coordination and organization, (5) means
coordination only and (6) corresponds to organization only.
4. Method and data
We apply the above model to investigate how trade and employers’ associations and inter-
locks interacted in the historical construction of business cooperation in Switzerland. We
focus on the MEM sector, which became, during the interwar period, the largest industrial
employer and exporter of Switzerland (Billeter, 1985). We use a sample of 35 large MEM1
companies for three benchmarks across the period we are interested in: 1910 (before the
Figure 1: Potential configurations of coordination and organization.
1 Accu Oerlikon, Ateliers de constructions mécaniques (ACMV), Aluminium Industrie Aktien
Gesellschaft (AIAG), Brown, Boveri & Cie (BBC), Bobst, Bucher, Buss, Société d’exploitation des
câbles électriques, a Cortaillod (Cortaillod), Société anonyme de Câbleries et Tréfileries de
Cossonay (Cossonay), D€atwyler, Eduard Dubied & Cie (Dubied), Escher Wyss, Appareillage Gardy SA
(Gardy), Georg Fischer, Hasler, Landis & Gyr, Metallwaren Zug, Metallwerke Dornach, MF Bühler,
MF Honegger, Maschinenfabrik Oerlikon (MFO), Oerlikon-Bührle, Paillard, Rieter, Saurer, Schindler,
Schlieren, Sécheron, Schweizerischen Industrie-Gesellschaft (SIG), Société genevoise d’instruments
de physique (SIP), Schweizerische Lokomotiv- und Maschinenfabrik (SLM), Sulzer, Von Moos, Von
Roll and Zellweger Uster.
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First World War), 1937 (interwar period) and 1957 (postwar economic growth). These en-
terprises were selected thanks to a database on Swiss elites in the 20th century, in which the
110 largest industrial and financial companies have been identified according to different cri-
teria such as the nominal capital, the number of blue-collar workers and the turnover (the
database can be consulted at: http://www2.unil.ch/elitessuisses; for more details on the firms’
selection, see David et al., 2015, pp. 473–476). First, we selected all the firms that belonged
to the MEM sector for the three benchmark years mentioned. In order to have a constant
sample for the whole period considered, we then excluded firms that were created after
1910 or that disappeared before 1957. We also had to put aside a few companies because in-
formation was too scarce. In addition to these 35 MEM firms, and because of the central
place of banks in the Swiss economy and in the corporate network, we took into account the
three largest banks of the country, namely the Schweizerische Kreditanstalt (Crédit Suisse),
the Schweizerische Bankgesellschaft (UBS, Bank in Winterthour until 1912) and the
Schweizerischer Bankverein (SBS). We identified the board of directors and executive officers
of these 38 firms, relying on different published sources such as stock exchange manuals, fi-
nancial yearbooks, annual reports or monographs.
In addition to these data, we identified for the same three benchmarks members of the ex-
ecutive committees (Vorstand) of the two BIAs of the sector, the VSM and the ASM. An im-
portant contribution of our article lies in the use of archival data for both associations and
three firms of our sample (Cossonay, Landis & Gyr and Georg Fischer), which allows us to
give a more qualitative interpretation of the cooperative process underway. We chose these
three firms because their archives were open to researchers, and because each of them was
representative of a distinctive pattern of cooperation.
We then carried out a network analysis (using Pajek software), based on members of
firms’ boards and associations’ committees in order to identify the evolution of the MEM
network of cooperation during the first half of the century. We considered there was a link
in the network when a person affiliated with one firm or association was sitting at the same
time on the board of another firm or association. We could thus identify what we called the
MEM business network, focusing on a one-mode network in order to see the links between
the firms and the associations. In the following section, we investigate the evolution of the
MEM network during the formative phase of business coordination in Switzerland accord-
ing to the theoretical model proposed in Figure 1 and the different possible configurations
between organization and coordination discussed in the theoretical part.
5. The construction of the Swiss MEM network
At the beginning of the 20th century, the MEM business network was neither very dense nor
cohesive, compared to the following decades. Table 1 shows the main indicators related to the
network for the three benchmark years. In 1910, 15 firms were isolated, that is to say none of
their directors were sitting on the board of another firm or on the executive committee of the
ASM or VSM associations. In 1957, only three enterprises were not integrated into the net-
work. The latter became thus more inclusive, and density—expressing the number of lines in
the network as a proportion of the maximum possible number of lines (de Nooy et al., 2005,
p. 63)—grew importantly (6.3% in 1910 and 18.3% in 1957).
This evolution can be partly explained by two factors. First, the size of the VSM execu-
tive committee increased during the period, integrating more firms. Generally speaking, the
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VSM became more representative during that period and reinforced its ‘logic of member-
ship’ (Schmitter and Streeck, 1999). Second, Table 1 shows that the mean board size of the
firms increased during that period, too. This contributed to the fact that interlocking direct-
orates among firms grew denser. Banks contributed for a very large part to this evolution, al-
though MEM firms developed many links with each other. Another interesting feature lies
in the fact that multiple lines (i.e. several shared members between two organizations), indi-
cating more cohesive ties (de Nooy et al., 2005, p. 63), also increased considerably during
that period. Thus, the MEM business network became clearly more cohesive and inclusive
during the first half of the century. In the following pages we investigate the three main
stages of this evolution.
In 1910, almost every theoretically possible configuration of coordination/organization
indicated in Figure 1 above existed in the MEM business network, except organization
through employers’ associations only (cf. Figure 2). However, most of the firms were not
represented on the executive committee of their BIAs,2 nor did they yet share a director with
another company or bank (the 15 isolated firms at the top of Figure 2). Several of these firms
(ACMV, Bobst, Cortaillod, Dubied, Gardy and Paillard) were established in French-
speaking cantons, while the core of the MEM industry lay in the German part of the coun-
try. At that time, some of these isolated firms (such as the firms in the canton of Geneva)
were members of regional employers’ associations. Others were owned and directed by per-
sonalities not ready to sacrifice a share of their own individual freedom to any kind of col-
lective action, considering their firm as a ‘private matter’ (Steinmann, 1958, p. 13).
Moreover, most of these companies were at that time rather small and not yet publicly
quoted (e.g. Bobst, Bucher); they thus had no large board of directors and fewer opportuni-
ties to share a member with another firm. There were indeed quite important differences
concerning the board size of companies at the beginning of the century.
In contrast to isolated firms, several companies were represented in both associations’
committees and had interlocking directorates with each other and with banks (AIAG, Georg
Fischer, BBC, Sulzer and SLM). This small group formed the core of the business network,
and we have called it the vanguard of coordination, as it was cumulating forms of coordin-
ation with some others of organization. These companies were mainly established in the
Table 1. MEM business network’s main indicators (1910, 1937 and 1957)
1910 1937 1957
Mean board size of the firms 7.0 8.3 9.3
Mean board size of the associations 15.5 16.0 20.0
Density (%) 6.3 12.8 18.3
Total number of lines 49 100 143
Multiple lines 11 28 53
Isolated firms 15 6 3
2 Some of them were, however, members of ASM and VSM (Buss, Dubied, Schindler and Sécheron),
or members of the VSM only (ACMV, Accu Oerlikon, Cossonay, Bucher, D€atwyler, Landis & Gyr,
Metallwerke Dornach, Zellweger Uster). Other firms, mostly from the French-speaking part of
Switzerland, were totally absent from both associations (Bobst, Cortaillod, Gardy, Hasler, Paillard).




















































































Figure 3: MEM business network in 1937.
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region of Zurich (BBC, Sulzer and SLM), the main industrial center of Switzerland, and
Schaffhausen (AIAG and Georg Fischer). At that time, no firm of the French-speaking part
was integrated into that core. Moreover, and unlike isolated firms, these firms were among
the largest employers of the sector and, generally speaking, were pre-eminent in the MEM
industry; for example, at the beginning of the 20th century, almost half of the electrical ma-
chines exported by Switzerland were produced by BBC (BBC, 1966, p. 187). As a conse-
quence, these firms were more likely to be represented on the VSM and ASM executive
committees and to interlock with other firms, as they already had large boards of directors.
The existence of this vanguard of coordination can partly be explained by the existence of
important family connections between the people who led MEM firms. Indeed, at that time,
family capitalism was the dominant form of corporate governance in the sector (on this
issue, see Ginalski, 2013). As a case in point among many other similar examples, in 1910,
Gustave Naville-Neher (1848–1929), a former manager of Escher Wyss, chaired the board
of AIAG and belonged to both the ASM and VSM executive committees, along with his
wife’s cousin, Robert Neher (1838–1925), who was the general manager of SIG and a mem-
ber of the board of Georg Fischer.
A clear will to coordinate and organize business interests emerged during the last decades
of the 19th century. Indeed, several people were involved in the creation of the ASM and the
VSM, such as Peter-Emil Huber-Werdmüller (1836–1915). The latter was the co-founder of
MFO (1876) and AIAG (1888), and was thus a pioneer in the MEM sector. In 1883, he was
among the founders of the VSM, promoting active cooperation among firms of the sector in
the context of the economic crisis of the 1870s and 1880s, in order to influence the economic
policy of the federal state (Humair, 2004, p. 384). One of the main issues at stake was to de-
fend the interest of the MEM industry in the tariff negotiations. In 1905, in the context of
increasing labor unrest, Peter-Emil Huber-Werdmüller, together with Gustave Naville-
Neher and other directors of BBC, MFO and Sulzer, founded the ASM. In 1910, Huber-
Werdmüller was the chairman of the board of AIAG and the chairman of both the VSM and
the ASM, which he chaired until his death in 1915.
Firms were, however, in a position to be able to choose to become members of both
BIAs. Indeed, only 76 firms out of the 111 members of the VSM decided to join the ASM in
1905.3 The 1910 business network thus resulted, for a large part, from the initiative of the
most important MEM firms that decided to cooperate together; this cooperation being rein-
forced by the strong ties between the two BIAs and by family connections between the peo-
ple leading these firms. The very strong ties between the ASM and the VSM illustrated in
Figure 2 remained constant throughout the three benchmarks, reflecting the involvement of
the same firms—and the same individuals—in both associations and preventing any dis-
agreements between the labor market policies and those concerning the product market.
A third group of companies was only represented on the VSM executive committee and
did not share directors with other firms (MF Bühler, Saurer, SIP and Von Moos)—or only
with banks (Von Roll and Escher Wyss). We can say that these firms took part in the least
constraining form of collective action, mainly in economic domains, and were thus engaged
in some forms of coordination and in the least constraining form of organization. Indeed,
the VSM, as a trade association, was much less demanding for its members; the association
was cheaper and granted broad freedom to firms to act as they wished. On the contrary,
3 Archive of the VSM, ‘Protokolle des VSM-Vorstandes 66-140’, Vorstand November 17, 1905, p. 14.
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becoming a member of the ASM executive committee implied strong commitment to collect-
ive action on matters such as working time, wages, strike insurance groups or recruitment
procedures (Gruner, 1988, pp. 813–836). As explained by Gustave Naville-Neher, the ASM
was to be set up on different principles to the VSM: ‘In order to set up a stronger associ-
ation, we must accept as members only those firms who engage in submitting themselves to
the status . . . and give the competencies to the executive committee to impose the decisions
made by the association on the members. [The VSM] is not able to do so because it depends
on the good will of firms . . .’4
Finally, some firms did not engage in any form of organization, but did in fact share
board members with other firms, such as Cossonay and Sécheron. As we will see, this small
component represented, in fact, the embryonic organization of a group of firms established
in the French-speaking part of the country.
To sum up, on the eve of the First World War, the large majority of the firms were more
or less reluctant to cooperate. Some engaged neither in coordination nor in organization,
while some others chose one way or the other (association or interlocking directorates).
Only a few firms were actively promoting sectoral coordination and organization.
Furthermore, the MEM corporate network relied at that time largely on regional ties, which
were constitutive of the formation of the network. For example, in 1909 Georg Fischer
decided to elect two leading figures in Schaffhausen onto the board of his firm, Robert
Neher and Carl Müller-Landolt, in order to give the greatest place to the area of
Schaffhausen but also to the bank of Schaffhausen.5
The interwar period corresponded with a sharp increase in the density of the MEM busi-
ness network: the number of isolated firms decreased from 15 firms in 1910 to 6 in 1937,
the simple lines doubled and multiple lines almost tripled (cf. Table 1 above). MEM elites
were thus clearly more cohesive in 1937 than in 1910. The most striking evolution consisted
of an increase in the number of firms involved in interlocking directorates and BIAs, simul-
taneously. In short, the vanguard of coordination had gained ground, and the core of firms
and actors that constituted this vanguard in 1910 had expanded significantly. Firms already
involved in 1910 remained integrated in the core of the network6 and were joined by new-
comers; Saurer, Dubied, Metallwerke Dornach, SIP and Von Roll, poorly connected in
1910, were sharing directors and holding seats in both associations in 1937 (cf. Figure 3).
In addition to the isolated firms, two companies were, however, still reluctant to cooper-
ate: Landis & Gyr and Hasler were only represented on the VSM committee.7 The former is
an interesting example. Although it was publicly quoted, its board of directors was com-
posed of Heinrich Gyr alone, who was not sitting on any other board. Furthermore, the firm
4 Archive of the VSM, ‘Protokolle des VSM-Vorstandes 66–140’, Vorstand November 17, 1905, p. 10.
5 Georg Fischer historical archive (þGFþHFA), ‘Protokolle der 86. Sitzung des VR der GF’, March 15,
1909.
6 An exception is AIAG, which temporarily left the ASM and VSM executive committees (but remained
as a member of both BIAs) during the interwar period. The firm apparently considered the ASM as
too constraining (See Archive of the ASM, ‘Protokolle der Vorstands- u. Ausschuss-Sitzungen 1918’,
Vorstand March 14, 1918, p. 11).
7 An internal report of the ASM indicates that in 1935 a share of about 30% of the VSM members did
not join the ASM; additionally, about the same share of the ASM members were not members of the
VSM. See Archive of the ASM, ‘Vorstand 10.1 / Ausschuss 10.2’, 1937, ‘An die Mitglieder des
Vorstandes: Verschmelzung von Arbeitgeberverband und Verein’, December 7, 1936.
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was not a member of the ASM at all, considering this association too constraining.8 It was,
however, a member of a regional employers’ association (the Arbeitgeberverband von Zug
und Umgebung).
Finally, some firms did interact only, or mostly, through interlocks. A meaningful ex-
ample was the group around the cable manufacturer Cossonay and the cartel it built with
Cortaillod, Gardy and Metallwerke Dornach (see Cortat, 2009). This group was very cohe-
sive, shared multiple interfirm ties and was not strongly connected with the VSM and the
ASM. This group of enterprises was thus mostly engaged in coordination and not in organ-
ization, as their relations were clearly set for production purposes. For example, they dis-
cussed the prices of the orders they received in order to find agreement on this issue.
Generally speaking, cartelization increased strongly within the economy during the interwar
period (Schröter, 1997; Cortat, 2010). In this perspective, Switzerland followed the German
way; interlocks grew denser as cartelization increased.
What led to such an increase in cooperation? At least four elements should be mentioned.
First, the First World War led to a sharp increase in interventions of the state in the econ-
omy, which increased pressure on companies to get organized. Second, the Swiss economy
became more fully integrated internally and more independent from external influence
(David et al. 2015, p. 127–151). The decrease in the number of foreign directors—and in
particular of German directors—after the war contributed, for a large part, to the increasing
collaboration among Swiss business elites. Indeed, in 1919, company law was amended;
from then on, at least one member of the board of Swiss firms had to be a Swiss citizen, and
the majority of board members had to be Swiss residents (Schnyder et al., 2005, p. 28).
Moreover, the war and the defeat of Germany also meant the ending of German electro-
mechanical firms’ financial investments in Swiss electrotechnical firms, which had been im-
portant as a result of insufficient Swiss financing (Segreto, 1992). This contributed to the
increase in ties between MEM firms and the three largest banks (coordination), which ap-
pears clearly in the 1937 MEM business network. More generally speaking, the rise of the fi-
nancial sector during and after the First World War led to the expansion of the largest
banks’ network in Switzerland (Mazbouri et al., 2012) and to the growing of interlocking
directorates between the banking and industrial sectors (Schnyder et al., 2005; Ginalski
et al., 2014).
Third, the end of the First World War also corresponded with the culminating point of
social unrest, marked by the general strike of 1918, which constituted a strong motivation
for firms to join the ASM (Billeter, 1985). Thanks to the ASM, MEM firms were able to co-
ordinate decreases of wages at sectoral level in 1921–1922 and 1932, which favored their
exports (Müller, 2010). From 1937 onward, the ASM set up collective labor agreements,
which regulated labor conditions. The most important one was the 1937 negotiation with
unions, leading to the ‘labor peace agreement’, as it would be later called, which forbade
strikes in the sector and increased stability for MEM firms. Here, adhesion of the MEM
firms to the ASM was then clearly induced by external pressure.
A last explanation can be found in the increasingly collective answer that the MEM elites
gave to the economic challenges of the period, and especially the economic downturn of the
1930s. To give an example, one can mention the creation of the Swiss Association of
8 Archiv für Zeitgeschichte, Zurich, L&G Archiv, C 108–201, Direktionskonferenz Protokolle, 01.01.32-
30.12.38, meeting of February 26, 1937 (N18).
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Standardization in 1919 by the VSM, which contributed to the setting up of 4500 norms in
the industry during the first 50 years of its existence (Ruggaber, 1969, p. 83). In 1934, the
VSM was also able to set up a partly public insurance against export risks (Rusterholz,
1986, pp. 247–269).
After the Second World War, the MEM business network was well established and very
cohesive; only three firms were not integrated into the network (Bucher, D€atwyler and
Metallwaren Zug; cf. Figure 4 above). Some firms were collaborating only through the VSM
(MF Honegger, Oerlikon-Bührle, Schindler and Von Moos). Some others favored interlock-
ing directorates as a means to cooperate, a very illustrative example being the cable cartel
around Cortaillod, in which firms shared multiple directors (at the top of Figure 4).
However, the most striking evolution was the strong development of the vanguard of coord-
ination, following patterns of coordination as well as organization. Most firms were indeed
from that point connected through interlocking directorates and BIAs. Moreover, apart
from a few firms in the French-speaking part of the country (Cortaillod, Cossonay and
Paillard), all firms were members of both associations, even if some of them were not sitting
on the executive committee. Cortaillod and Cossonay (both in the cable cartel) were mem-
bers of a regional employers’ association, which was considered by the ASM as an ‘action






































Figure 4: MEM business network in 1957.
9 Archive of the ASM, ‘Protokolle der Vorstands- u. Ausschuss-Sitzungen 1944’, Ausschuss December
15, 1944, p. 13.
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Most firms that were still reluctant to cooperate during the interwar period yielded never-
theless to the pressure of the collective action. Indeed, Fernand Turrettini (1882–1951), dir-
ector of the Geneva-based SIP, mentioned, in a private letter to the ASM, three reasons for
his company to join the association: he recognized that the ASM had acted usefully in favor
of social peace, he did not want to be considered a ‘maverick’ anymore and he acknowl-
edged the necessity of joining the association in order to be able to influence its policy.10
Again, the war contributed to this increasing cooperation within the MEM sector. BIAs
were indeed strongly involved in the economic war mobilization and the VSM and the ASM
started to fulfill new tasks in partnership with the state. The VSM was deeply involved in the
control of MEM firms’ exportations, and it incited them to get organized. So did the ASM;
thanks to the fast development of collective labor agreements, which became the cornerstone
of labor market management, this association became more and more important and tripled
the number of its members between 1938 and 1948.
The Second World War also reinforced the fear of foreign infiltration and the need to
unite against it. As stated by Schnyder et al. (2005, p. 33), ‘This escalation favored further
national control over Swiss firms and accentuated corporate interlocking’s function as one
of several instruments to achieve this goal.’ In this context, the war also contributed to the
national integration of the corporate network, overpassing the regional articulation of inter-
locks that existed in the first place.
From that time on, MEM companies developed more interlocking directorates within
their own sector than with other industrial or financial sectors (Ginalski, 2015). We can
identify at least four different factors—not excluding one another—that were behind these
interfirm ties. First, some interlocks came from cross-shareholdings—and in some cases, re-
ciprocal cross-shareholdings. For example, the multiple links between Sulzer and Saurer in
1937 and 1957 resulted from the reciprocal cross-shareholding concluded between the two
firms during the 1920s, and the related exchange of directors (Wipf et al., 2003, pp. 135–
136). Second, interlocking directorates occurred between firms that were operating in simi-
lar markets. At the beginning of the 1940s, AIAG, the main Swiss aluminum producer,
decided to undertake aluminum wire drawing. This was obviously perceived as a threat by
the cable manufacturer Cossonay, as in 1942, both firms signed an agreement in which
AIAG gave up aluminum wire drawing in return for a 20% stake in Cossonay and a seat on
its board of directors. As a consequence, Cossonay gained the quasi-monopoly of aluminum
wire drawing.11 Third, interlocks also occurred between firms that were operating in differ-
ent markets, such as AIAG and Sulzer; the former was buying some equipment produced by
the latter (Ginalski, 2015, p. 191). Finally, we have to point out the fact that in some cases,
MEM firms were only interlinked through bankers, as banks occupied a central place in the
corporate network from the interwar period onward. This was the case in 1957 for Georg
Fischer and Sulzer, whose common directors were the chairmen of UBS (Fritz Richner) and
Crédit Suisse (Ernst Gamper). On this point, Ernst Homberger (1869–1955), chairman of
Georg Fischer’s board, declared a few years earlier that the appointment of Ernst Gamper
10 Archive of the ASM, ‘Vorstand 10.1/Ausschuss 10.2.’, 1943, Letter from Ferdinand Turrettini to the
ASM, December 7, 1943, pp. 2–3.
11 Archives cantonales vaudoises, PP 632, Société anonyme des câbleries et tréfileries de Cossonay
(23), Board of directors January 22, 1942, pp. 183–184. On this issue, see also Cortat (2009, pp. 188–
189, 258 and 401).
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on the board of Sulzer had been a ‘bad surprise’, as members of Georg Fischer’s board
should not accept mandates in other foundries, because these mandates represented for the
firm ‘a serious competition’.12 This quote allows us to make two important observations.
First, the fact that firms were collaborating more and more after the First World War did
not mean that there was no more competition at all. Second, it is important to investigate
the nature of the interlock. Here, Sulzer and Georg Fischer were competitors and were not
linked together by inside directors. However, the fact that two bankers sat on the board of
both firms might have eventually contributed to decrease this competition, even if it was un-
wanted by the firms in the first place.
As represented in Figure 4 above, the vanguard of coordination had thus managed to im-
pose itself. Coordination and organization had cumulative effects, BIAs and interlocking dir-
ectorates complementing one another during the post-war economic growth period. A
culminating point of this collaboration was the Gentleman’s Agreement adopted by the
Swiss bankers’ association in 1961, by which bankers agreed to refrain from selling Swiss
companies’ stocks to foreigners. As Etienne and Schnyder (2014) show, this agreement was
neither in the interests of the bankers nor imposed by an external force, but corresponded
rather to a ‘strong solidarity’ logic of action among the actors involved. The strong collabor-
ation illustrated in Figure 4 remained very stable until the end of the 1980s. At that point,
this system became increasingly called into question by economic globalization, liberaliza-
tion and shareholder value ideology, which contributed to the decline of the network of co-
ordination (Widmer, 2011; Ginalski, 2015, pp. 154–162).
6. Conclusion
Our aim was to investigate how and why firms engaged in collaborative behavior through
BIAs and interlocking directorates, and how these two logics interacted. For this purpose,
we resorted to Höpner’s (2007) distinctive concepts of coordination and organization. As
we have shown, cooperation through the trade association (VSM), the employer association
(ASM) and interlocking directorates was actively promoted from the beginning of the 20th
century—or even from the end of the 19th century—by capitalists of the largest firms, who
progressively managed to impose this model on the whole sector. ‘Si vis pacem, para bel-
lum’, claimed Eduard Sulzer-Ziegler in 1910, trying to convince capitalists to unite against
labor and socialism. In this sense, the construction of business coordination was motivated
by political factors—the struggle against socialism, but also a will to prevent an intervention
of the state in the business area—thus supporting Martin and Swank’s (2012) interpretation
of the construction of business interests. However, the ‘vanguard of coordination’, to which
Sulzer-Ziegler belonged, always promoted a diversified and multi-channel cooperation. The
ASM was primarily an ‘institution of organization’ responding to the external pressure led
by the increasing power of the labor movement, while interlocking directorates and the
VSM were essentially ‘institutions of coordination’, defending the long-term economic inter-
ests of capitalists. As we have shown, many firms were reluctant to cooperate in the first
place, favoring individualistic solutions over collective ones; some of them engaged in coord-
ination only, while others privileged organization. Both world wars and the 1930s economic
crisis eventually contributed to reinforce a cohesive collective action of the MEM sector.
12 þGFþHFA, ‘Protokolle der 260. Sitzung des VR der GF AG’, May 13, 1954.
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During the first half of the 20th century, Swiss capitalists responded thus with growing zeal
to Sulzer-Ziegler’s injunction and at the end of the 1950s, most MEM firms were engaged in
institutions of coordination as well as organization. Our results thus show that both the eco-
nomic needs of firms and the political pressure must be taken into account in order to ex-
plain the emergence of business cooperation.
Interestingly, the sustained adhesion to the employers’ association after World War II (al-
though the ‘labor peace agreement’ had been concluded in 1937) shows that organization can
rise from within the sector itself, and not only from external pressure, a result in line with
Etienne and Schnyder’s (2014) findings. In this sense, business cooperation appears as more
than a reactive force, even though the concept of organization also captures Mayntz and
Scharpf’s (1995) concept of ‘shadow of the hierarchy’, according to which political elites could
always step in. Another important finding of our study lies in the identification of additional fac-
tors that pushed industrialists to engage in cooperation. For instance, family ties, as well as re-
gional and linguistic proximity also played an important role. This finding does not contradict
other theories of the emergence of coordination discussed in this article, but rather shows that
social and cultural factors were also important for the construction of business cooperation.
Coordination and organization vary across time, between sectors, regions and nations
(Höpner, 2007, p. 27; Crouch, 2009, p. 93). As noted in the ‘Introduction’, disentangling
the different dimensions of non-liberal capitalism helps to identify different national trajec-
tories toward liberalization. For instance, according to Höpner (2007, pp. 13–16), in the
1990s, Sweden combined a high level of organization with a lower level of coordination,
whereas Germany was relatively highly coordinated and organized. Thelen (2014, p. 194f.)
shows that in the mid/late 2000s, Sweden maintained a high level of equality in spite of
declining coordination, whereas Germany became more unequal, although institutions of
coordination were maintained. For Höpner (2007, p. 27), Germany underwent a decline in
both organization and coordination, although disorganization went further than the declin-
ing capacity to coordinate.
We argue that differentiating between organization and coordination contributes to a
more nuanced understanding of the emergence of non-liberal capitalism as well. As the case
of the Swiss MEM industry shows, firms followed different trajectories toward business co-
operation during the first half of the century. The configuration that dominated during the
30 years of post-war economic growth was thus the result of a complex diachronic process.
In order to determine if our findings are limited to the MEM sector or can be applied to the
Swiss economy in general, our theoretical model should be tested on other Swiss economic
sectors. Moreover, it would be promising to integrate Switzerland in cross-national compari-
sons. Notably, comparing the formative phases of business cooperation in Sweden and
Switzerland respectively—two countries with strong divergence on the relative levels of or-
ganization and coordination in the 1990s—could highlight different trajectories in the con-
struction of business cooperation.
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recherche’, Vingtième Siècle, Revue d’Histoire, 115, 115–127.
Katzenstein P. (1984) Corporatism and Change. Austria, Switzerland, and the Politics of Industry,
Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press.
Lanzalaco, L. (2008) ‘Business Interest Associations’. In Jones G. and Zeitlin J. (eds) The Oxford
Handbook of Business History, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 293–318.
La Porta, R, Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A (1999) ‘Corporate Ownership around the
World’, The Journal of Finance, 54, 471–517.
Martin, C. J. and Swank, D. (2012) The Political Construction of Business Interests,
Coordination, Growth, and Equality, New York, Cambridge University Press.
Mach A. (2006) La Suisse entre internationalisation et changements politiques internes: la législa-
tion sur les cartels et les relations industrielles dans les années 90, Zurich and Chur, Rüegger.
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